Money, Monopoly and the Contemporary World Order by Hopkins, Benjamin T.
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 2 
Number 1 Spring Article 8 
May 2020 
Money, Monopoly and the Contemporary World Order 
Benjamin T. Hopkins 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Benjamin T. Hopkins, Money, Monopoly and the Contemporary World Order, 2 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 63 
(1972). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital 
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-
commons@du.edu. 
MONEY, MONOPOLY AND THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD ORDER
BENJAMIN T. HOPKINS*
Whatever else they have accomplished, President Nixon's
dramatic policy moves last August have stimulated a lot of re-
thinking about political-economic trends in the contemporary
world. In my case, the result has been accelerated change in
my views about the relative importance of the questions of
government economic policy which face the inhabitants of
spaceship Earth, about the possible answers to these questions
and about the characteristics of the social decision-making
processes that will generate the answers. In these terms, this
"comment" sketches a comprehensive but tentative hypothesis
about current developments. A key feature of the hypothesis
is the importance it attaches to monetary and financial arrange-
ments as determinants of the world political-economic order.
IMPORTANT ECONOMIC POLICY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Government exchange rate policies
The question of what national governments should do about
exchange rates among important international monetary assets,
including gold, was raised by President Nixon's unilateral de-
cision in August to close the American gold window. Like the
British decision to "go off gold" in 1931, President Nixon's
decision followed a long period of commitment, in practice as
well as theory, to the principle of governmental exchange rate
"pegging" via open-market operations involving gold and
currencies.
I am convinced that national governments will not in the
foreseeable future refrain from buying and selling large quan-
tities of gold and other international monetary assets for the
purpose of influencing market exchange rates and expectations.
The wealth position of too many important "private" interests
(which government officials choose or feel obliged to serve)
are affected by these rates. In particular, the governments of
major non-U.S. trading nations will continue to intervene in
foreign-exchange markets for the purpose of dampening short-
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run fluctuations in the prices of their currencies with respect
to other major currencies. But they will not try to eliminate
short-run fluctuations entirely, and I believe they will permit
"average" or "central" exchange rates to "crawl" (whether or
not this is officially announced), especially if the alternative is
endless hikes in central bank dollar holdings. Similarly, the
U.S. Government will peg the dollar price of gold only so long
as this is convenient; when it becomes even slightly incon-
venient, the gold window will close or the price will change.
Such a pattern of behavior by important foreign govern-
ments will very much enhance the attractiveness of the dollar
to foreigners for use in domestic as well as international trans-
actions, and also for precautionary and speculative purposes.
This is because the stability of the dollar's real purchasing
power (stemming initially from the breadth, depth and "open-
ness" of the American marketplace plus the existing world-wide
popularity of the dollar) Will rise relative to the other major
currencies, insofar as their exchange rate against the dollar
becomes more changeable.
Government reserves and the intergovernmental financing of
payments deficits
The question of what international monetary assets national
governments should hold and use for exchange-rate pegging
operations or other purposes was technically raised when the
American gold window closed, but was quickly put to rest when
it became apparent that the primary purpose of this move was
to free-up the price of the dollar in terms of other major cur-
rencies, not to demonitize gold. A unilateral decision by the
U.S. to demonetize its still enormous gold stock and to "go off
gold" permanently would indeed go a long way toward elimi-
nating the monetary role of gold in both governmental and
private international transactions. But it would probably not
be sufficient for this purpose and, in any event, it is not a neces-
sary conditon for dollar pre-eminence around the world. Indeed,
the threat of such action, directed against governments which
(foolishly) are committed to the monetary role of gold, is far
more useful than the action itself to those who manage the
dollar - namely, the President, Congress, the Federal Reserve
Board, and important commercial bankers. Thus, I believe that
the monetary role of gold insisted on by some governments
will persist but will hence forth serve mainly to amuse (per-
haps to enrich) private speculators and to strengthen the
political-economic hand of the U.S. Government.
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The needs of governments for international monetary re-
serves will be met by a combination of gold, dollars, and Spe-
cial Drawing Rights. Since the U.S. will not undertake to peg
the dollar to anything but gold - and even that, if it becomes
inconvenient- it needs no other reserves than the ten billion in
gold which it already holds. Non-U.S. governments must, for
the most part, choose between dollars and SDR's. From the U.S.
point of view it matters little which is chosen since the U.S.
Government and American bankers will be the largest -creditors
and beneficiaries via seignorage and control. Nor do I antici-
pate much disagreement concerning the aggregate quantities of
dollar-SDR reserves held by non-U.S. governments. For the U.S.
has much to gain and little to lose by financing the deficits and
the dollar accumulations of other countries. The cost is limited
to the bank ledger entries involved, plus slower short-run
growth in consumption and investment at home (due to trade
surplus) - a small price to pay for huge seignorage gains and
a financial stranglehold on foreign countries, especially when
foreign investment is rapidly becoming as American as apple
pie.
Thus the "international liquidity" of non-U.S. countries will
be adjustable by them in accordance with their own pref-
erences, and questions concerning liquidity will cease to hold
the center-stage position which they have occupied for the last
ten years.
Government restrictions on international capital transactions
The question of what restrictions governments should im-
pose on international capital-fund transactions is also more
likely to be decided without turmoil in the future than it has
been in the past. Wider and more flexible "crawling bands"
for exchange rates seem likely to reduce the volume of short-
term capital flows that have caused so much distress among
national monetary officials in recent years. Those which re-
main will be regulated along with long-term capital flows as
minimally as possible. In order to cash in on the benefits of
world-wide dollar hegemony, the U.S. Government is almost
certain to remove the few restrictions it now imposes on inter-
national dollar capital flows. Other countries which do not
follow suit will, to that extent, suffer exclusion from the bene-
fits of the huge and growing volume of world trade and invest-
ment conducted with dollars.
Thus crawling bands, coupled with the economic induce-
ments of growing dollar hegemony around the world, favor the
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minimization of governmental restrictions on international
capital movements involving dollars. Such minimization will,
in turn, enormously increase the attractiveness of the dollar
and the political economic power of those who manage it.
Government restrictions on international trade
The question of what restrictions governments should im-
pose on international transactions involving real goods and
services is also destined for smoother disposition and therefore
less attention than it has previously received. The reason is
analogous to one of the reasons which suggest the lowering of
restrictions on international capital movements: countries which
choose to engage in a trade war with the United States will lose
out economically while others prosper. Only if non-U.S. coun-
tries engage in collective bargaining and if the U.S. overreaches
- only then will trade restrictions become an important issue.
The first of these contingencies is farfetched for the simple
reason that there are too many non-U.S. countries with ancient
traditions of rivalry and double-cross. Moreover, the many in-
fluential Europeans who are getting rich from U.S.-European
trade are not likely to permit their governments to engage in
a trade war with the U.S. In the unlikely event that the mem-
bers of an expanded European Economic Community can agree
on a strong anti-U.S. position, the U.S. can threaten increased
trade with Japan, Eastern Europe, Russia, and Latin America,
not to mention Africa and China.
Government monetary and fiscal policies
The question of whether and, if so, how governments
should employ monetary and fiscal policies for balance-of-pay-
ments or other international purposes will become more alive
than it has been, although I believe that some of the answers
are foreordained.
Parochial monetary policies have recently been blamed for
international economic difficulties. Added to such disfavor is
the increasing impotence of (non-U.S.) monetary policies in a
dollar-dominated world. Non-dollar money stocks and interest
rates will continue to become both less important than their
dollar counterparts and more helplessly tied thereto. This will
cause much agony among non-U.S. officials who are thoroughly
addicted to monetary sovereignty, even though they have al-
ready lost most of it in practice. Kicking the habit will not be
easy, but it will happen simply because the drug will become
more and more scarce.
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With the gradual demise of (non-U.S.) monetary policy as
a governmental policy instrument, fiscal policy will receive
much more attention and stir more controversy than it has
in the past. Governments will increasingly rely on special pat-
terns of expenditure and taxation for international as well as
domestic purposes. Border tax adjustments and discriminatory
investment tax credits, for example, will become more popular
and more controversial.
U.S. monetary policy, of course, will be supremely
important.
The United States balance of payments
The question of what the United States and other govern-
ments should do about the U.S. balance of payments and in
particular, its currently large "deficits", has effectively been
removed from international debate by President Nixon's uni-
lateral moves and all of the developments which I have dis-
cussed above. So long as the U.S. economy remains richly
productive, open to outsiders, and relatively inflation-free the
U.S. has no reason to worry about its "overall deficit", however
defined and measured. Occasional dissatisfaction with the struc-
ture (composition) of trade or capital flows may call for minor
changes in government policy, but this is quite a different mat-
ter from sweeping changes in monetary, fiscal, commercial, or
exchange control policies in response to the fact that many
more dollars are being transferred by Americans to foreigners
than vice versa. For a world of dollar supremacy, this fact is
to be welcomed as the source of additional seignorage and
influence!
The "burden of adjustment" will be on foreign govern-
ments, whether they like it or not and, for reasons already
indicated, they will almost certainly resort to exchange rate
flexibility as their primary instrument of adjustment. This will
further strengthen the dollar, as argued above.
Government regulation of the "Eurodollar" market
However much European governments may wish to regu-
late the Eurodollar market (out of existence!) neither they nor
their influential banker and industrialist constituents will be
willing or able to do so. For the Eurodollar market exists pre-
cisely because the dollar not only facilitates but is necessary to
current levels of business profit in today's international econ-
omy. it is a subsystem in the world-wide pattern or matrix of
dollar-financed trade and investment.
68 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY VOL. 2
Economic policies of non-U.S. countries toward each other
Because there is so little that non-U.S. governments can
profitably do about American policies except make the best
of them, the most critical questions of economic policy for them
will be how to regulate economic transactions among them-
selves - in plainer language, how to conduct themselves so as
to maximize their respective shares of whatever is not gobbled
up by the American monolith - and how to obtain special
favors from those who control it. These will also be important
questions for the United States government, if only because the
joys and profits of empire can only be reaped under conditions
of general tranquility. Thus the future role of the U.S. as
arbiter-patron will be crucial to it as well as to other
governments.
Economic policies toward less-developed countries
The scramble around Goliath's feet has special importance
for the "developing" or "less-developed" countries. For unless
they very much improve their bargaining positions and skills,
they are likely to lose ground relative to western European
governments, Japan, and Canada. This would provide excellent
opportunities for sphere-of-influence expansion and rivalry by
Russia and China. Thus the question of what economic policies
the industrialized western countries (especially the United
States) should adopt with respect to the less developed coun-
tries assumes great importance. This importance is enormously
increased by the continuing fact that the vast bulk and the most,
rapidly growing portions of the world's population resides in
less-developed countries, in a state of unmitigated squalor and
misery.
Economic policies regarding the use of
irreplaceable resources: pollution
Insofar as the U.S. dominated international economy con-
tinues to expand output with currently popular technologies,
there is a high and increasing likelihood that human life -
perhaps all life - will become impossible by the end of this
century. It hardly needs stating that this raises the most im-
portant of all questions about government economic policies:
what should governments do about the immiment prospect of
ecological disaster?
Summary
It seems likely then, that familiar questions of government
economic policy concerning exchange rates, international liquid-
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ity, trade restrictions, capital flow restrictions, the U.S. balance
of payments, and the Eurodollar market - have rather suddenly
become less important as a result of President Nixon's decision
to use and exploit the international political-economic muscle
of the United States. This muscle results from a combination
of pre-eminence in resource control, economic output, tech-
nology, managerial and financial know-how, lending capacity,
and monetary importance -not to mention military power. In
short, it results from a monopoly position in all the essential
ingredients of political-economic power, a combination which
far exceeds even the wildest dreams of nineteenth century
Britain.
New relative importance attaches, under these conditions,
to questions concerning government budgets, U.S. monetary
policy, economic relations among non-U.S. countries, less-
developed countries, population growth, and pollution.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RELEVANT DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES:
CONSTITUTIVE MATTERS
Now we come to a series of questions which may have more
inherent interest for lawyers and less for economists, as com-
pared with the foregoing.
Who will participate in or influence the decisions which
will emerge, as a matter of history, to answer the questions of
government economic policy discussed above - especially the
questions whose answers are not largely foreordained by over-
whelming political-economic realities?
Which of these participants will perform each of the various
decision-making activities - informing, recommending, prescrib-
ing, invoking, applying, and sanctioning?
Following what procedures?
Applying what sanctions?
The answers to these questions will vary to some extent
with the economic policy question involved. For example, the
large, varied, and mobile currency holdings of the big multi-
national corporations make them key participants in decision-
making about foreign exchange rates, whether governments like
it or not. When it comes to questions about reserves and
liquidity, on the other hand, central bankers will play the domi-
nant role. I will not attempt to make such distinctions here,
however. Instead, I will generalize without reference to par-
ticular policy questions, leaving the reader to make appropriate
qualifications.
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Central bankers will play a much more modest role than
they did before August, 1971. Finance ministers and heads of
state will dominate center-stage - as they have done since
August. The International Monetary Fund and the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs will, more than ever, function
and appear as a thin disguise for American dominion over the
world economy; they will in fact serve little purpose and may
well be discarded. The Group of Ten, or an even more exclusive
inner circle of major governments - dominated by the U.S. -
will prescribe, apply, and enforce the international law of gov-
ernment economic policy, following the procedures of traditional
diplomacy instead of procedures like those used in the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. Such procedures will be less formal,
more secret, and less richly recorded than those which were
followed prior to August, 1971. The "inner" group will prob-
ably include Britain, Germany, France, and Japan - in addition
to the U.S.. "Non-member" countries will of course be able to
inform, recommend, and invoke- but probably with less effect
than in the IMF or GATT contexts. This is especially true for
the less-developed countries which will be left with even less
of an authoritative role in international economic lawmaking
than they previously enjoyed as in the Fund and the GATT.
The few hundred largest multinational banks and indus-
trial firms, most of them American, will increasingly (though
privately) coordinate their decision-making and lobbying in
such a way as to become legislature-court-policeman for the
whole world, rivaling the major governments and thoroughly
dominating the lesser ones.
Inside the U.S. - the locus of awesome international politi-
cal-economic clout - there may develop an acute struggle be-
tween the Federal Reserve, now primary bank of issue for the
world, and the White House, which has charge of all but the
monetary instruments of government economic policy. (I as-
sume little or no interference by Congress.) Very strong pres-
sures will develop, I believe, for the subordination of Federal
Reserve policies to the White House world economic master
plan. In addition, it is likely that important conflicts about
international economic matters will develop from time to time
among various multinational industries, between American
labor unions and multinational management, or between groups
of multinational firms and the federal government.
Concluding observations
All signs points to the grandest and final flowering of
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American empire during the next ten to twenty years. Giant
American multinational industrial and banking firms, collabo-
rating with the U.S. government and two or three others, will
make decisions that will shape the near and long-term destiny
of the human species. Those who see the United States today
entering a period of political-economic decline fail to under-
stand, in my opinion, the importance of monopoly in human
affairs and the organizing potency of the social institution we
call money. Only general nuclear war, new forms of pestilence,
ecological disaster, escalating domestic strife, or hyper-inflation
of the dollar could prevent the increasing American pre-
eminence I foresee. Of these I believe that ecological disaster
is the most likely.
An absolutely crucial device for communication and sanc-
tioning in this enormously complex and highly centralized
social system is MONEY- in particular, the American dollar,
which has emerged as the basic unit of account, medium of
exchange, and store of value in the world economy. This makes
the Federal Reserve Board central banker for the world, and it
makes the "soundness" of the dollar the most important of all
the U.S. government's political-economic objectives. For the
whole system is likely to fall if the dollar is badly managed-
e.g., if U.S. inflation gets out of hand.
The moral of the story is that when one tribe gets much
bigger and richer than all the others and when it uses the
money device shrewdly, it can dominate the world and do any-
thing it wants to do within reason, all the while strengthening
its position without relying primarly on military force. The
other tribes, at least so long as they remain relatively ununi-
fied, have no choice but to search, beg, or fight among them-
selves for crumbs from the giant's meal. It's the company town
writ large: everyone is compelled by the lack of alternatives to
sell and buy in large quantities at the largest store in town.
I believe that somewhere in the White House files there is
a confidential study with conclusions much the same as mine.
I believe that President Nixon agrees with these conclusions,
has acted on them, and will continue to do so, with the object
of realizing the fullest possibilities of American empire-
probably without regard to the impact on masses of under-
privileged peoples at home and abroad. The question I raise,
then, is: who will benefit and who will suffer from this flower-
ing of American empire? To what end do we facilitate profit-
able international trade and investment by our huge multi-
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national corporations with a skillfully contrived and managed
monetary and financial system?
The most urgent task for lawyers, economists, business
executives, union leaders and others who more or less share
my view of current developments is to use their knowledge of
the relevant decision processes to increase the probability that
important decision-makers around the world will switch their
attention from old, familiar concerns such as exchange rates
and international liquidity to the really important issues of the
day such as pollution, poverty, and population, and then come
up with life-sustaining decisions.
